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If the distribution of organs becomes subject to the success of individual
publicity campaigns, with organs going to those who hire the best PR firms
and lawyers, who on the waiting list would remain confident that their
priority would be decided on the merits . . . [a]nd who would agree to donate
organs to a system supposedly based on rational, humane, and fair selection
criteria but that would actually be determined by the assets of the highest
bidder?1

* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate, 2015. Special thanks to
Professor Robert Schwartz for his insight and guidance.
1. Brett Norman, Will Girl’s Transplant Hurt System?, POLITICO (June 12, 2013, 08:06
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/sarah-murnaghan-organ-transplant-policy-92694.
html (quoting Daniel Wikler, medical ethics expert at Harvard).
[75]
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Introduction

You have been diagnosed with organ failure and told you need an organ
transplant to live. You are placed on the transplant waiting list knowing that
there is a real risk you may die prior to receiving an organ transplant, your
last hope for survival. You hear the story of a millionaire receiving an organ
transplant in a state far from his home shortly after being listed . . . and two
children being placed on an adult list to receive lung transplants . . . you
think, how can that be? Can I be placed on additional waitlists to increase
my options and chances of obtaining an organ transplant?
Organ transplantation has been a life-saving treatment option for many
who require this intervention due to organ failure. However, there are many
legal and ethical considerations regarding allocation of this limited resource.
Some of these issues were brought to the forefront in the highly publicized
cases of Steve Jobs, Sarah Murnaghan, and Javier Acosta.2 These were
instances where it appeared that in getting their transplants, these individuals
obtained an unfair advantage over others on the waitlist. When a resource is
as scarce as an organ for transplantation, equitable distribution policies are
integral to a just allocation system.
The late Steve Jobs obtained a liver transplant in Tennessee, despite
being a resident of California.3 Jobs was able to obtain a transplant in
Tennessee because the transplant policies allow individuals to join multiple
waitlists.4 However, not everyone has the same ability to access multiple
waitlists due to the financial burden of going through an evaluation at each
transplant center, and the inability to travel far distances at a moment’s
notice.5
In the case of the children, Sarah Murnaghan and Javier Acosta, both
were suffering from end-stage cystic fibrosis and required lung transplants
in order to survive.6 Since the availability of adult organs far exceeds the

2. Kaja Whitehouse, Jobs Doctor’s House Deal Raises Eyebrows, NEW YORK POST (Dec. 10, 2013,
1:26 AM), http://nypost.com/2013/12/10/house-deal-by-steve-jobs-doctor-raises-eyebrows/.; Lauran
Neergaard, Challenging the Transplant System: Ruling That Allows Dying Child to Jump Waiting List Stirs
National Debate, NATIONAL POST (June 7, 2013, 2:44 PM), http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/06/07/sarahmurnaghan-and-javier-acosta-organ-transplant-rulings-stir-debate/.
3. Whitehouse, supra note 2, at 1.
4. See OPTN Policies § 3.4G, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 7, 2014),
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf#nameddest=Policy
_5_Organ_Offers_Acceptanc.
5. See infra Part III.B. See also William Saletan, How Did Steve Jobs Get His Liver?,
SLATE (Jan. 19, 2011 8:55 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature
/2011/01/how_did_steve_jobs_get_his_liver.html.
6. Michelle Castillo, Bronx Boy Who Challenged Child Lung Transplant Rules Receives
Organs, CBSNEWS.COM (Dec. 31, 2013, 1:38 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/bronx-boywho-challenged-child-lung-transplant-rules-receives-organs/.
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availability of pediatric organs7 by as much as fifty times more,8 the parents
of these children sought to set aside the United Network of Organ Sharing
(UNOS) prohibition against children being placed on the adult transplant
waitlist.9 Through judicial intervention, these children were able to obtain a
temporary restraining order (TRO) against the UNOS “under age twelve
rule” so that they could be considered for adult lungs based on the medical
urgency of their cases.10 In granting the TROs for these children, Judge
Baylson held that the under twelve rule “discriminates against children and
serves no purpose, is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.”11
Ultimately both children received adult lungs that they may not have
otherwise received.12 The cases of these children received much publicity
and ultimately led to a temporary policy change at the Organ Procurement
and Transplantation Network (OPTN).13 The policy change is due to expire
July 2014 but is being considered for permanent adoption.14
The public sentiment was that any parent would do the same if faced
with the circumstances Sarah Murnaghan and Javier Acosta’s parents were.15
However, as Secretary Sebelius of the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) stated at the time, it was an “incredibly agonizing situation
where someone lives and someone dies.”16 Sebelius also noted that there
7. Ryan Jaslow, Children Added to Adult Lung Transplant List Amid Outcry a Dilemma for
Doctors, CBSNEWS.COM (July 8, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/children-added-toadult-lung-transplant-list-amid-outcry-a-dilemma-for-doctors/ (Marlie Hall presenting) (reporting
that in 2012 there were twenty lung donors under the age of twelve while there were 1700 adult
lung donors).
8. Janet & Francis Murnaghan v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 13-3083 (E.D.
Pa. June 5, 2013) (order granting temporary restraining order); Janet & Francis Murnaghan v. U.S.
Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 13-3083 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2013) (supplemental memo);
Milagros Martinez v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 13-3119 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2013)
(order granting temporary restraining order).
9. E.g., Norman, supra note 1.
10. Murnaghan TRO, supra note 8; Martinez, supra note 8.
11. Id.
12. Id. See also Murnaghan supplemental memo, supra note 8.
13. At-a-Glance: Proposal for Adolescent Classification Exception for Pediatric Lung
Candidates, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., available at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/
PublicComment/pubcommentPropSub_345.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
14. See infra Part III.C. See also At-a-Glance: Proposal for Adolescent Classification
Exception for Pediatric Lung Candidates, supra note 13.
15. Bethany Mandel, Organ Allocation Should be Done by Doctors, Not Judges,
COMMENTARY(June 12, 2013 7:00 AM), http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/06/13
/organ-allocation-should-be-done-by-doctors-not-judges/ (stating “One cannot help but feel the
utmost sympathy for families like the Murnaghans as they watch, helplessly, as their child
suffers.”).
16. Sebelius Rejects 10-Year-Old Girl’s Appeal for Life-Saving Waiver From Federal
Regulation, GRABIEN, https://grabien.com/file.php?id=5990&searchorder=summary (last visited
Mar. 30, 2014).
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were three other children in the same hospital under similar life-and-death
circumstances17 and that there were forty others on the highest-acuity list in
Pennsylvania at the time.18 As Dr. Stuart Sweet, medical director of the
world’s largest pediatric lung transplant program in St. Louis stated, “‘the
organ allocation system is designed to offer organs as fairly as possible for
every patient waiting for organs’”19 and if the system is changed for one
patient’s advantage, then there is another patient who will be at a
disadvantage.20
This note will address the inequities of the current organ transplant
waitlist system. Section II will begin with a review of the history of the
organ transplant system in the United States. Section III will examine the
transplant waitlist process and organ allocation systems. Sections IV and V
will discuss options to consider in pursuit of achieving a more equitable
organ transplant system.

II. Background
A. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act

The current mechanism for organ donation in the United States is
through an anatomical gift.21 Prior to 1968, organ donation was handled at
the state level and systems varied significantly from state-to-state.22 The
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) promulgated in 1968 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was the first piece of
legislation regarding organ transplantation in the United States, creating the
power that was not yet recognized at common law to donate organs, eyes,
and tissue as a gift.23 The UAGA was revised in 1987 and again in 2006.24

17. Mandel, supra note 15.
18. Sebelius Rejects 10-Year-Old Girl’s Appeal for Life-Saving Waiver From Federal
Regulation, supra note 16.
19. Robing Young and Jeremy Hobson, Dying Girl Sparks Debate Over Organ Transplants,
NPR Here & Now, (May 30, 2013) available at http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2013/05/30/pediatricorgan-transplants.
20. Allahpundit, Sebelius: I can’t suspend the lung-transplant rules for a dying 10-year-old,
HOT AIR (June 4, 2013 8:01 PM), http://hotair.com/archives/2013/06/04/sebelius-i-cant-suspendthe-lung-transplant-rules-for-a-dying-10-year-old/.
21. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (2006) Summary, Unif. Law Comm’n, http://uniformlaws.org/
ActSummary.aspx?title=Anatomical Gift Act (2006) (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
22. Legislative, ASSOCIATION OF ORGAN PROCUREMENT ORGANIZATIONS,
http://www.aopo.org/legislative-a33 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
23. Timeline of Historical Events Significant Milestones in Organ Donation and
Transplantation, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.organdonor.gov/
legislation/timeline.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014); Legislative, supra note 22.
24. Id.
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All states had adopted the 1968 UAGA, but only twenty-six states enacted
the 1987 revision resulting in non-uniformity amongst the states.25 The
diversity in the law amongst the states was considered an impediment to
transplantation.26 Thus, the 2006 revision was an attempt to increase
efficiency of the organ transplant system by resolving perceived
inconsistencies in the system and is limited in scope to donations from
deceased donors.27 The 2006 revision has been adopted in every state except
Delaware, New York, Florida, and Pennsylvania where it has been
introduced for consideration this year.28
The UAGA has three goals in mind including: (1) encouraging
individuals to make anatomical gifts; (2) respecting the autonomy of
individuals in deciding whether or not to make an anatomical gift; and (3)
prohibiting the sale and purchase of organs.29
B. National Organ Transplant Act

In 1984 the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) was passed by
Congress.30 NOTA prohibits the sale of human organs, established the
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) to ensure fair and
equitable allocation of donated organs, and provided grants to establish and
expand organ procurement organizations (OPOs).31 The OPTN organizes
the procurement, distribution, and transplantation of organs and is managed
by a private non-profit organization, United Network for Organ Sharing
(UNOS).32 OPTN is managed by UNOS through contract with the Health
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) of the Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS) and has been the only organization managing

25. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, supra note 21.
26. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act (2006) Prefatory Note 1, available at http://www.
giftofhope.org/about_donation/pdf/2006_Revised_UAGA.pdf.
27. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, supra note 21.
28. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (2006), Enactment Map, Unif. Law Comm’n,
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical+Gift+Act+(2006) (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
29. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act (2006), supra note 26 at 2. See Verheijde, Rady & McGregor,
The United States Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (2006): New Challenges to Balancing
Patient Rights and Physician Responsibilities, PHILOSOPHY, ETHICS, AND HUMANITIES IN
MEDICINE (Sept. 12, 2007), http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/19#B7 (discussing the tension
between the revised UAGA encouraging continued medical intervention to ensure suitability of
organs for transplantation and the wishes of the deceased as indicated in advanced directives).
30. Timeline of Historical Events, supra note 23.
31. Id.; Selected Statutory and Regulatory History of Organ Transplantation, DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.organdonor.gov/legislation/legislationhistory.html (last
visited Mar. 30, 2014).
32. Furrow, Greaney, Johnson, Jost & Schwartz, Health Law: Cases, Materials and Problems
1487 (7th ed. 2013).
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the OPTN since 1986 when it was first awarded the contract by DHHS.33
UNOS and OPTN have a shared board of directors that includes medical
professionals, regional representatives, and general public representatives.34
Specifically, the OPTN board must include fifty-percent transplant surgeons
and physicians and at least twenty-five percent transplant candidates,
transplant recipients, organ donors, and family members.35 The OPTN
committees and its board of directors develop policies while UNOS
coordinates committee and board actions.36
OPTN is charged with establishing: (1) a national list of individuals in
need of organs, either through regional centers or in one location; (2) a
national system of organ matching; and (3) criteria for allocation of organs.37
OPTN must also assist OPOs in equitable distribution of organs among
transplant patients nationwide and work actively to increase the supply of
donated organs.38
All OPOs must participate in the OPTN39 and be certified by the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS).40 Additionally, all OPOs are members
of the Association of Organ Procurement Organizations.41 Fifty-eight OPOs
exist in the United States and are responsible for increasing the number of
registered donors and coordinating the donation process when actual donors
become available within their designated service area.42 Some states like
Hawaii and Alabama have one OPO, while other states such as New York
and Ohio have up to five OPOs.43 CMS conditions of participation require
that any hospital involved in the procurement of organs must be a member
of an OPO while a hospital that performs organ transplants must be a

33. Id.; OPTN, UNOS, http://www.unos.org/donation/index.php?topic=optn (last visited
Mar. 30, 2014); Organ Donation and Transplantation Save Lives, ORGANDONOR.GOV,
http://www.organdonor.gov/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
34. OPTN/UNOS Board of Directors, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.
hrsa.gov/members/boardOfDirectors.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
35. 42 C.F.R. § 121.3 (2014).
36. Policy Management, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.
hrsa.gov/policiesAndBylaws/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2014). See id. for a full listing of OPTN duties and responsibilities.
38. Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 273 (2014).
40. Organ Procurement Organizations, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://organdonor.gov/
materialsresources/materialsopolist.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
41. Id.; Members, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/members/
(last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
42. Id.
43. See id.
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member of the OPTN.44 These conditions of participation apply to heart,
heart-lung, intestine, kidney, liver, lung, and pancreas centers.45
The nation has been divided into eleven geographic regions by OPTN
to facilitate transplantation.46

Figure 1 Regions, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/converge/members/regions.asp.

Each region is represented on the OPTN/UNOS Board of Directors.47 These
regions are further delineated into donation service areas (DSA) defined as
“[t]he geographic area designated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) that is served by one organ procurement organization
(OPO), one or more transplant hospitals, and one or more donor hospitals.”48

III. Waitlisting & Allocation Decisions
A. The Dreaded Waitlist

Despite the OPTN and OPOs being charged to increase the supply of
donated organs, the gap between individuals in need of transplant and donors
is widening.49

44. 42 C.F.R. § 482.45 (2014); 42 C.F.R. § 482.72 (2014). See 42 C.F.R. § 482.104 for
additional requirements for kidney transplant centers.
45. 42 C.F.R. § 482.68 (2014).
46. Members, supra note 41.
47. Id.
48. See, OPTN Policies § 1.2, Definitions, available at http://optn.transplant.
hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf#nameddest=Policy_8_Allocation_of_Kidneys
(last updated Mar. 7, 2014).
49. The Need is Real: Data, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/about/
data.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
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There are over 120,000 candidates awaiting transplant50 and although
an average of seventy-nine transplants are conducted daily, another eighteen
individuals die due to organ shortages.51 Of those currently waiting for
transplant, over 99,000 are waiting for kidneys.52 Transplant candidates are
only placed on the waiting list for an organ at a transplant program if the
transplant program has current OPTN transplant program approval for that
organ type.53

Figure 2 The Need is Real: Data, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/about/data.html.

Currently there are 244 transplant centers nationwide.54 Determining
whether an individual is a candidate for transplant at a given time varies
amongst transplant centers across the country.55 That is because discretion
is left to the medical professionals and individual hospitals in deciding when

50. Data, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/ (last visited
Mar. 30, 2014).
51. The Need is Real: Data, supra note 49.
52. Data, supra note 50.
53. OPTN Policies § 3.4.B, Approved Transplant Program Requirement, available at
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf#nameddest=Policy_8_
Allocation_of_Kidneys (last updated Mar. 7, 2014).
54. Members, supra note 41.
55. Furrow et al., supra note 32 at 1489.
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to add a candidate to the list.56 Each center has its own criteria for listing
transplant candidates.57 When an individual is referred to a transplant center
for evaluation and placement on the transplant list the “transplant center runs
a number of tests and considers the patient’s mental and physical health, as
well as his or her social support system[]” prior to accepting or rejecting the
individual for placement on the list.58 Transplant centers also ask about an
individual’s financial situation, including insurance or other resources to pay
for the surgery and immunosuppressant medication following
transplantation.59 This means that an individual may be rejected for listing
at one transplant center but accepted and placed on the list at another
transplant center.
B. Multiple Listing Quandary

Transplant candidates are explicitly allowed to register at multiple
transplant sites for the same organ.60
Candidates may be registered for an organ at multiple transplant
programs within the same Donation Service Area (DSA) or different DSAs.
A transplant program may choose whether or not to accept a candidate
seeking multiple registrations for an organ. Transplant hospitals may access
a report from the OPTN Contractor that identifies any candidates that have
multiple registrations for the same organ. This report will not include the
identities of the other hospitals where the candidates are registered.61
It is this policy that allowed the late Steve Jobs to be placed on multiple
lists for his liver transplant. Similarly, the TRO that both Sarah Murnaghan
and Javier Acosta obtained allowing them to be placed on the adult waitlist
while still on the pediatric list was consistent with this policy.
Much of the controversy surrounding multiple listing is that transplant
centers do not have similar access to organs—“not all OPOs are created
equal.”62 It is well established that hospitals vary widely in the number of
56. Id.; How the Transplant System Works: Matching Donors and Recipients, UNOS,
http://www.unos.org/donation/index.php?topic=fact_sheet_1 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
57. Frequently Asked Questions, Transplant Living, http://www.transplantliving.org/
community/patient-resources/frequently-asked-questions/#donAwarenessHelp (last visited Mar.
30, 2014).
58. How the Transplant System Works: Matching Donors and Recipients, UNOS,
http://www.unos.org/donation/index.php?topic=fact_sheet_1 (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
59. What Every Patient Needs to Know, United Network for Organ Sharing 7 (2013),
https://www.unos.org/docs/WEPNTK.pdf.
60. OPTN Policy § 3.4G, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 7, 2014),
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf.
61. Id.
62. Chad J. Wilson, Note, Working the System: Should Patients in Need of an Organ
Transplant Be Able to Join Multiple Waitlists?, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 229, 242 (2011).
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transplants they perform and that OPOs vary widely in the number and types
of donors they receive each year.63 Some consider multiple listing as
“gaming the system.”64 Not everyone can access multiple lists because
[f]irst you have to show up for an extensive in-person evaluation. Then
you have to be available for a transplant in the area within hours of an organ
becoming available. And while one jurisdiction might accept you as a
charity case, if you want to play the field you’ll have to prove you can pay
for the transplant yourself. You also get priority points for being able to
guarantee follow-up medical care, since this assures transplant allocators that
the organ will be well cared for.65, 66
The American Medical Association (AMA) Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs (CEJA) finds multiple listing problematic because “reliance
on criteria of questionable ethical value may lead to inherently unfair or
unjust allocation decisions” and “the different interpretations and valuations
assigned to each criterion by different decision makers can result in
inconsistent decisions across institutional lines.”67
Instead CEJA
recommends five factors that should be considered in allocation of scarce
resources such as organs including:
(1) the likelihood of benefit to the patient
(2) the impact of treatment in improving the quality of the patient’s life
(3) the duration of benefit
(4) the urgency of the patient’s condition (i.e., how close the patient is
to death), and
(5) the amount of resources required for successful treatment.68
These recommendations have yet to be fully considered, embraced, or
implemented by UNOS.

63. About Transplantation: Transplant Process, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN.,
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/learn/about-transplantation/transplant-process/ (last visited Oct. 19,
2014).
64. Saletan, supra note 5.
65. Id. See also, Family Sues Insurer Who Denied Teen Transplant, NBC News (Dec. 21,
2007 6:05 PM) http://www.nbcnews.com/id/22357873/ns/health-health_care/t/family-suesinsurer-who-denied-teen-transplant/#.Uzoso8tOWM8 (discussing case of teen who died prior to
obtaining insurance approval for coverage of transplant).
66. E.g., Study Shows ‘Gaming’ in Heart Transplant System, Science Daily (Mar. 9, 2004),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2004/03/040309072201.htm. Another type of gaming is
transplant centers exaggerating the severity of a potential recipient’s symptoms to increase the
chances of obtaining an organ for transplantation. See id.
67. Ethical Considerations in the Allocation of Organs and Other Scarce Medical Resources
Among Patients, Am. Med. Ass’n (1993), http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/code-medicalethics/216a.pdf.
68. Id.
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When an individual is listed at a transplant center, he or she is generally
considered for organs from a donor in that local area first.69 If a patient is
put on the list at multiple transplant centers, then he or she will be considered
for donated organs that become available in multiple local areas.70 Although
the policy allows for multiple listing in the same local area, because each
OPO has a defined service area71 and there is a limit to designating one OPO
to each service area,72 there appears to be no advantage to listing at multiple
centers in the same OPO.73 Each region may establish regional review
boards (RRBs) for specific organs to provide “confidential medical peer
review of transplant candidates placed on the waiting list at a more urgent
status than the standard listing criteria justifies.”74 The RRBs may then
decide whether the requested status is appropriate following a review of the
justification forms submitted by the transplant center documenting the
candidate’s current condition.75 Transplant hospitals are to ensure that
individuals are placed on the transplant waiting list as soon as his or her
candidacy for transplantation has been determined.76
C. Allocation Enigma

When a deceased organ donor is identified the OPO accesses the UNet
system, the centralized UNOS computer network that electronically links all
transplant hospitals and OPOs, which then generates a ranked list or match
run of candidates who are suitable to receive the organ.77

69. About Transplantation: Transplant Process, supra note 63.
70. Id.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 273 (2014).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8 (2014).
73. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 57.
74. OPTN Bylaws Article IX § 9.3, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HEUMAN SERVS. (effective as of
Feb. 2014), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Bylaws.pdf.
75. Id.
76. 42 C.F.R. § 121.5 (2014).
77. Before the Transplant: About Organ Allocation, TransplantLiving.org, http://www.trans
plantliving.org/before-the-transplant/about-organ-allocation/matching-organs/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
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Figure 3 Before the Transplant: About Organ Allocation, TransplantLiving.org, http://www.transplantliving.org/beforethe-transplant/about-organ-allocation/matching-organs/.

Factors affecting candidate ranking include tissue match, blood type,
length of time on the waiting list, immune status, distance between the
potential recipient and the donor, and degree of medical urgency (for heart,
liver, lung and intestines).78 OPTN is clear that for each organ that becomes
available, UNet’s ranking of potential recipients is based on the objective
criteria specific to that organ.79 OPTN further states that “[e]thnicity, gender,
religion, and financial status are not part of the computer matching
system.”80
UNOS has a national distribution policy for most organs, relying on
medical urgency and waitlist time for allocation.81 “Prior to 2000, UNOS
policy was to retain organs in the geographic area where they were recovered
if a transplant candidate with the appropriate medical status was in that area,
even if patients with a more urgent need or who presented better survival
prospects waited in other regions.”82 The justification for organ retention in
78. Id.
79. Donor Matching System, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.
hrsa.gov/learn/about-transplantation/donor-matching-system/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
80. Id. (emphasis in original). But see, Racial and Geographic Disparity in the Distribution
of Organs for Transplantation, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. Office of the Inspector
Gen. OEI-01-98-00360 (June 1998), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-9800360.pdf (indicating that racial and geographic disparities exist in waitlist times).
81. Furrow et al., supra note 32, at 1488.
82. Id.
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local geographic areas is organ viability.83 The distance between the donor’s
hospital and the potential recipient’s hospital is more important for matching
hearts and lungs than it is for kidneys or livers because the heart and lungs
can survive outside the body for only four to six hours while kidneys can
survive up to thirty-six hours and livers up to twelve.84
Each organ type has a specific allocation policy.85 Distinct allocation
calculators are utilized for each type of organ.86 The allocation of hearts,
livers, lungs, and kidneys all include special pediatric provisions whereas
allocation of intestines and pancreas do not.87 The allocation of kidneys, the
organ in highest demand, is done “locally first, then regionally, and then
nationally.”88 This clearly encourages individuals in need of a kidney
transplant to engage in multiple listing to increase his or her chances of
transplantation. Unfortunately, multiple listing is not a realistic option for
everyone.89 Even the purported objective criteria used to determine organ
allocation include a level of subjectivity that may exacerbate inequities in
organ distribution. For instance, the Calculated Panel Reactive Antibody
(CPRA) is one of the three allocation calculators used to identify kidney
candidates,90 and is used to estimate the percentage of likely incompatible
donors based on the candidates’ unacceptable antigens.91 Discretion is left
to the transplant centers to determine their own criteria for unacceptable
antigens.92 Each transplant center may specify the minimum acceptance
criteria for a deceased donor organ and maximum antigen mismatch.93 If the
transplant program specifies a mismatched antigen maximum, then the OPO
will only offer organs from deceased donors with mismatched antigens equal
to or less than the maximum specified.94 Thus a potential candidate may be
83. See Organ Matching Process, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/about/
organmatching.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
84. Id.
85. OPTN Policies §§ 6 - 11, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 7, 2014),
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf.
86. Allocation Calculators, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.
hrsa.gov/converge/resources/allocationcalculators.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
87. OPTN Policies §§ 6 - 11, supra note 85.
88. OPTN Policy § 8.5B, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 7, 2014),
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf.
89. See discussion supra Section III.B.
90. Allocation Calculators, supra note 86.
91. About CPRA for Professionals, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.
hrsa.gov/converge/resources/allocationcalculators.asp?index=77 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
92. Id.
93. OPTN Policy § 5.2, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 7, 2014),
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf.
94. Id.

11-3 MACROED_MCCARTHY_HUMA_NOTE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

88

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

11/10/2014 5:08 PM

[Vol. 7:1

determined to not be a match at one transplant center, but at another
transplant center would be a match.
The lung allocation system for candidates twelve years of age and older
is based upon a lung allocation score (LAS).95 Donor lungs are offered to
candidates according to their medical characteristics, directing lungs to
candidates with the most urgent medical need and the greatest chance of
survival, instead of relying on waitlist time.96 The measures used to calculate
the LAS are: waiting list urgency measure, or the expected number of days
a candidate will live without a transplant during an additional year on the
waiting list; the post-transplant survival measure, or the expected number of
days a candidate will live during the first year post-transplant; the transplant
benefit measure, or the difference between the post-transplant survival
measure and the waiting list urgency measure; and the raw allocation score,
which is the difference between transplant benefit measure and waiting list
urgency measure.97 These measures are then plugged into an equation
specified by the OPTN to determine an individual’s LAS.98 Priority is given
to candidates based on his or her LAS, blood type, and the geographic
distance between the candidate and the donor hospital.99 Age factors in only
so far in as lungs from pediatric and adolescent donors are offered first to
pediatric and adolescent transplant candidates before they are offered to
adults.100
Prior to June 10, 2013, lung candidates younger than twelve years old
were sorted based on pediatric priority waiting time and total waiting time,
longest to shortest.101 The pediatric candidates were assigned as priority one
and priority two.102 Priority one was assigned to pediatric candidates with
respiratory failure, pulmonary hypertension, or as an exception granted by
the Lung Review Board (LRB).103 All other pediatric candidates were

95. Frequently Asked Questions About the Lung Allocation System (LAS), HEALTH RES. &
SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/converge/resources/allocationcalculators.
asp?index=86 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
96. Id.
97. OPTN Policy § 10.5, The LAS Calculation. (Mar. 7, 2014), http://optn.transplant.
hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf#nameddest=Policy_8_Allocation_of_Kidneys.
98. See id.
99. Frequently Asked Questions About the Lung Allocation System (LAS), supra note 95.
100. Id.
101. OPTN Policy § 10.4, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 7, 2014),
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf.
102. OPTN Policy § 3.7.6.2, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (old policy as of Sept. 1,
2013), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies_Old.pdf.
103. Id.
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assigned priority two.104 Within each priority blood type and then waitlist
time were used to identify eligible candidates.105
Following Murnaghan and Acosta’s involvement of the judicial system
to obtain an advantage over others on the pediatric waitlist, OPTN
reevaluated its pediatric allocation policy and has temporarily approved a
policy permitting pediatric lung candidates to request an exception from the
LRB to be classified as an adolescent to be prioritized by LAS.106 This
“adolescent classification exception” is due to expire on July 1, 2014.107
However, the OPTN Thoracic Committee is considering permanent
implementation of the policy change as it allows for pediatric candidates who
are suitable for lung offers from larger donors to apply for an exception.108
Some may argue that what Murnaghan and Acosta did through judicial
intervention was justified in that it spurred a change in the pediatric lung
allocation policy. However, the issue still remains that the system was
changed for these specific individuals to obtain an advantage for
transplantation resulting in a disadvantage to another individual on the
waitlist.109 The stated goal is to provide equitable allocation of organs
amongst potential recipients,110 but the question remains as to how this can
best be achieved.

IV. National Distribution
The OPTN uses geographical areas for organ allocation including DSA,
region, nation, and zones. Although UNet centralizes the organ transplant
system, the distribution of organs is initially at a local level and then
expanded to a broader geographic area if the organ is not matched or is
declined in the local area.111 Thus, although OPTN is charged with
establishing a national list of individuals in need of organs,112 the national
list is simply the names of the individuals in need of transplantation
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Proposal for Adolescent Classification Exception for Pediatric Lung Candidates, supra
note 13.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Allahpundit, supra note 20.
110. 42 C.F.R. § 121.8 (2014).
111. See OPTN Policy § 2.1, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 7, 2014),
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf (stating “Each organ
procurement organization (OPO) must establish criteria for an acceptable deceased donor or
deceased donor organ for the transplant programs in its Donation Service Area (DSA). If a host
OPO rejects a deceased donor, the OPO must offer the organs to OPOs that have more liberal
acceptance criteria.”).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2014).
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nationwide. The national system that is alluded to is actually just general
criteria set out by UNOS and OPTN that centers are to rely on in matching
donors and candidates as well as for allocation purposes. But there is much
discretion left to the OPOs and the transplant centers.
The idea of a national transplant list has been discussed as far back as
when NOTA was first passed. Although Congress called for OPTN to
“establish one nationwide list of individuals awaiting transplantation and a
national system that would allow for donated organs to be quickly matched
with medically suitable candidates on that list” national distribution was not
mandated.113 Rather than establishing a national list and a national system
in one central location, it specified this could occur in regional centers.114
For instance, transplant programs have discretion in establishing criteria for
organ acceptance.115 Thus one transplant center may accept organs that
another would decline.
The arguments against a national list include the likely increase in need
for cross-country transportation of organs, prolonging ischemia times and
resulting in the wastage of donated organs, increased re-transplantation rates,
fewer transplanted candidates and more waitlist deaths.116 However,
currently multiple listing is allowed requiring cross-country transportation
of the individual requiring transplantation. Thus, individuals who can afford
it are able to travel to a distant transplant center to obtain the donated organ.
Organ survivability will likely not be affected whether it is the organ
travelling from the donor hospital to the recipient hospital or the individual
in need of transplant travelling across the country because the organ is
outside of a human body for the same duration. Implementing a system
whereby organs are distributed nationally and the organ travels from the
donor hospital to the recipient hospital would be more equitable than the
current system allowing for those who can afford it to be listed at multiple
transplant centers.
A national system with uniform policies and standards is essential to a
more equitable distribution system.117

113. Mark R. Yessian, Testimony on Organ Donation, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.
(Apr. 8, 1998), http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t980408b.html.
114. Id.
115. 42 C.F.R. § 121.6 (2014).
116. Neal R. Barshes, Carl S. Hacker, Richard B. Freeman Jr., John M. Vierling & John A.
Goss, Justice, Administrative Law and the Transplant Clinician: The Ethical and Legislative Basis
of a National Policy on Donor Liver Allocation, 23 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 200, 218
(2007).
117. Yessian, supra note 114.
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V. Reducing the Waitlist
A. HIV Organ Policy Equity Act

The HIV Organ Policy Equity (HOPE) Act enacted November 2013
allows for the transplantation of organs from donors infected with HIV to
recipients who are infected with HIV.118 It is estimated that 500 individuals
infected with HIV will be eligible for transplants annually.119 This will in
turn reduce waitlists for individuals not infected with HIV.120 OPTN has
convened a workgroup to develop criteria for conducting research on organs
procured from HIV-positive individuals in order to assess the feasibility,
effectiveness, and safety of transplantation of HIV infected organs.121
Although this is a promising step in the right direction, the shortage of organs
will not be alleviated through this measure alone.
B. Opt-in versus Opt-out

The UAGA adheres to an opt-in principle whereby an “individual
becomes a donor only if the donor or someone acting on the donor’s behalf
affirmatively makes an anatomical gift.”122 This is contrary to an opt-out
standard whereby consent is presumed “rendering all persons de facto organ
donors unless they choose to expressly opt-out.”123 Some argue that an optout standard may help increase organ donation.124 However, this does not
appear to be the case in Europe, where many countries have adopted the
presumed consent standard but do not have better donation rates than the
United States.125 This may be because even with the presumed consent laws,
explicit approval is still required.126 If the U.S. instituted presumed consent

118.
119.

113 P.L. 51 codified in 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2014).
New Law Offers Hope to HIV-Infected Patients Awaiting Organ Transplants, JOHNS
HOPKINS NEWS RELEASE (November 21, 2013), http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/
media/releases/_new_law_offers_hope_to_hiv_infected_patients_awaiting_organ_transplants.
120. Id.
121. Work Group to Address OPTN Policy Relating to HIV-positive Organ Recovery, HEALTH
RES. & SERVS. ADMIN. (Mar. 27, 2014), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/news/work-group-toaddress-optn-policy-relating-to-hiv-positive-organ-recovery/.
122. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act (2006), supra note 26, at 2.
123. Sara Naomi Rodriguez, Comment, No Means No, But Silence Means Yes? The Policy &
Constitutionality of the Recent State Proposals for Opt-Out Organ Donation Laws, 7 FIU L. REV.
149, 151, 156, 157 (2011). For information on a third organ procurement standard mandated
choice, see id. at 156–57.
124. Furrow et al., supra note 32, at 1491.
125. Henry Hansmann, Markets for Human Organs, in A Legal Framework for Bioethics 145
(Cosimo Marco Mazzoni et al., eds., 1998).
126. Id.
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laws, in which strictly enforced and explicitly held approval is not required,
then the donor pool would potentially see an increase.
C. Compensation for Donation

United States law prohibits the sale of human organs.127 This stems
from ethical and moral values as well as fear of the poor being taken
advantage of.128 However, due to the scarcity of organs available for
transplantation, those who can afford it seek solutions outside of U.S.
borders.129 The phenomenon whereby individuals who have the means go to
another country where organ purchase is permitted, or at least not
specifically prohibited, transplant tourism is on the rise due to organ
shortages.130 Some medical professionals are concerned about the substandard care the organ recipients may be receiving.131 In one case, someone
who had gone to China for transplantation, returned for follow-up care to his
providers in the U.S.132, 133 Shortly thereafter, he became septic, was
hospitalized, and ultimately transplanted again in the U.S.134 There was
some disagreement amongst the transplant team whether it was morally right
to provide him with a transplant, but the consensus was to proceed based on
the nonjudgmental regard and beneficence principles of medical ethics.135
Thus, not only did this individual go to another country and purchase an
127. 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2014).
128. See generally Erica D. Roberts, When The Storehouse is Empty, Unconscionable
Contracts Abound: Why Transplant Tourism Should Not be Ignored, 52 HOW. L.J. 747 (2009).
129. See generally Robert Ainley, Organ Transploitation: A Model Law Approach to Combat
Human Trafficking & Transplant Tourism, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 427 (2011); Jacqueline Bowden,
Feeling Empty? Organ Trafficking & Trade: The Black Market for Human Organs, 8 Intercultural
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 451 (2013); Jennifer M. Smith, Dirty Pretty Things & The Law: Curing The
Organ Shortage & Health Care Crises In America, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 361 (2008).
130. Laura MacInnis, “Transplant tourism” On Rise Due to Donor Shortages, REUTERS (Mar.
30, 2007, 1:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/03/30/us-transplants-idUSL3042
128920070330.
131. Transplant Tourism Poses Ethical Dilemma for US Doctors, SCIENCE DAILY (Jan. 27,
2010), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/01/100126133354.htm.
132. Id.
133. For discussion on China’s program harvesting organs from prisoners which is now being
phased out see Michelle Castillo, China to Stop Harvesting Organs From Executed Prisoners, CBS
NEWS (Aug. 16, 2013, 3:58 PM) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-to-stop-harvesting-organsfrom-executed-prisoners/; Li Hui and Ben Blanchard, China to Phase Out Use of Prisoners’
Organs for Transplants, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2013, 8:28 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/08/15/us-china-organs-idUSBRE97E09920130815; Calum MacLeod, Organ
Harvesting Changes in China Will be Tough to Realize, USA TODAY (Updated May 15, 2012, 9:47
AM) http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-05-14/china-organ-transplant-ban/
54964098/1.
134. Transplant Tourism Poses Ethical Dilemma for US Doctors, supra note 131.
135. Id.
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organ that could have gone to someone else, when that transplant failed, he
ended up requiring another transplant in the U.S.
There are also the ethical considerations regarding paid organ donors—
many of whom are poor and do not receive adequate follow-up care.136
Individuals, who sell their organs or tissue, are referred to as vendors.137 One
study conducted on vendors in Pakistan revealed that all but two of the thirtyfour subjects had “sold a kidney to pay off debts owed to landowners, or to
pay for medical expenses, burial of the dead, or dowries related to
marriage.”138 The vendors felt as though they lacked other options and
turned to selling an organ, which opponents of organ sales say is a
perpetuation of social and economic inequality rather than the vendor
exercising the freedom to make an autonomous choice.139 In some cases, the
vendors did not even receive the promised payment that led him or her to
agree to selling the organ in the first place.140, 141
Iran has legalized the sale of organs.142 Living non-related donation of
kidneys was legalized in 1988 and a government-organized transplantation
system was established to regulate and fund the transplant process as well as
compensate donors for organs.143 The Dialysis and Transplant Patients
Association, a third-party independent association, was established to
arrange contact between donors and recipients and still carries out this
function while staffed on a voluntary basis by end-stage renal failure
patients.144 It is illegal for the medical and surgical teams involved in the
transplant to receive any form of payment.145 The donors receive free health
136. MacInnis, supra note 131.
137. Caroline Helwick, WCN 2009: Sale of Kidney Leaves Vendors Regretful, Depressed,
MEDSCAPE (May 26, 2009), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/703311.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Rob Verger, Israel’s Campaign To Halt Organ Trafficking Tourism, THE DAILY
BEAST (Mar. 18, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/18/israel-s-campaign-tohalt-organ-trafficking-tourism.html.
141. For discussion on the prolific organ purchase system in Israel see Michael Finkel, This
Little Kidney Went to Market, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (May 27, 2001), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/27/magazine/27ORGAN.html?pagewanted=all (“[T]here have
been instances in which a patient has elected not to accept the offer of a kidney donation from a
well-matched relative. ‘Why risk harm to a family member?’ one patient told me. Instead, these
patients have decided that purchasing a kidney from someone they’ve never met—in almost all
cases someone who is impoverished and living in a foreign land—is a far more palatable option.”).
142. Rupert Major, Paying Kidney Donors: Time to Follow Iran?, MCGILL JOURNAL OF MED.
Volume 11(1) 67-69 (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC2322914/#b2-mjm11_1p67.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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insurance and the recipients are provided with subsidized
immunosuppression.146 To prevent transplant tourism, Iran has outlawed
potential recipients from abroad travelling to Iran to receive a kidney
donation from an Iranian.147 It appears that Iran may have successfully
addressed the shortage of organs with reported outcomes for recipients being
favorable.148 However, opponents of the Iranian system indicate that there
are still substantial waiting times for organs and that the poor are still the
ones being preyed upon for donations.149
The U.S. prohibition on organ sales does not include “the reasonable
payments associated with the removal, transportation, implantation,
processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a human organ or
the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of a
human organ in connection with the donation of the organ.”150 This is
consistent with the view of the American Medical Association,151 and may
actually serve to encourage living donation.152
The concerns of the poor being forced into donation due to dire
circumstances are primarily regarding living donors. However, there may
be a market for cadaveric organs.153 One idea for a cadaveric organ market
is a futures market.154 The right to harvest an individual’s organs upon the
individual’s death would be purchased in advance while the individual is
alive and in good health.155 This could be done through health insurance
companies.156 The inducement would be a lower insurance premium for
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Saeed Kamali Deghan, Kidneys for Sale: Poor Iranians Compete to Sell Their Organs,
THE GUARDIAN (May 27, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/27/iranlegal-trade-kidney.
149. Major, supra note 143. But see Deghan, supra note 149 (“As a result, there is no shortage
of the organs—but for those trying to sell a kidney, there is a lot of competition.”); Benjamin E.
Hippen, Organ Sales and Moral Travails Lessons from the Living Kidney Vendor Program in Iran,
POLICY ANALYIS No. 614 (Mar. 20, 2008), (“[O]nly one country in the world doesn’t suffer from
an organ shortage: Iran.”).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 274(e).
151. Policy E-2.15 Transplantation of Organs from Living Donors, Am. Med. Ass’n,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medicalethics/opinion215.page? (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
152. The U.S. allows for compensation for blood, sperm, egg, and more recently, bone marrow
donations. See generally Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2011); Doug Mataconis, Federal
Court Legalizes Compensation For Bone Marrow Donors, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (Dec. 3, 2011),
http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/federal-court-legalizes-compensation-for-bone-marrowdonors/.
153. Hansmann, supra note 126, at 145.
154. Id. at 147.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 147-49.

11-3 MACROED_MCCARTHY_HUMA_NOTE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2015]

DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE

11/10/2014 5:08 PM

95

those who agree to donate, or alternatively a penalty for those who decline
to donate.157 However, it is unlikely that penalizing an individual for
refusing to donate would be Constitutional as it infringes on an individual’s
liberty, autonomy, and privacy.158 Another more realistic option is to have
the state purchase the rights when an individual is obtaining or renewing a
driver’s license or state identification through a reduction in the fee for the
license or identification.159 All states have legal consent driver’s license
donor designation provisions.160 Hence, the foundation for implementing
future markets in cadaveric organs exists and only determination of price or
premium reduction need be considered.161

VI. Conclusion
Organs are a scarce resource and as such require equitable distribution
policies to ensure a just allocation system. While UNOS and OPTN are
charged with oversight of the transplant system to ensure equitable
distribution of the life-saving organs, much discretion is left to OPOs and
transplant centers, resulting in variations in listing and distribution criteria.
Allowing for multiple listing only serves to exacerbate the inequities
inherent in the system.
One solution could be to fully embrace a national distribution system.
Another option to reduce the waitlist includes the recently passed HOPE Act
which could ultimately permit HIV-positive donor to HIV-positive recipient
transplantation, resulting in reduction of the waitlist for individuals not
infected with HIV. Lastly, considering compensation for both living donors
modelled after the Iranian system, and cadaveric donors in a futures market
framework may serve to reduce the ever-widening gap between donors and
those in need of transplants.

157. Id. at 147.
158. See generally Rodriguez, supra note 124 (discussing Constitutional concerns of
implementing an opt-out system as opposed to the current opt-in system in the U.S.).
159. Hansmann, supra note 126, at 148 n.3.
160. State Organ Donor Legislation, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/
legislation_micro/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
161. Hansmann, supra note 126, at 148 n.3.

